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I. Introduction 
Decision making is a process of complex cognitive operations that are performed 
consciously and is influenced by personal as well as environmental variables. Gender is 
among the variables that affect cognitive operations and allows researchers to establish 
differences at the individual level. In fact, many aspects of economic decision making 
have been found to differ by gender. A common finding is that these differences are 
caused by differences in preferences (e.g., in risk preferences, social preferences) and 
reactions to competition (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Yet the reasons why there are 
preference differences between genders are not well known. There are two possible 
mechanisms by which preferences can be shaped between genders: a) preferences are 
shaped by gender roles that are set by social and behavioral norms and b) preferences are 
shaped by biological and physiological differences of the two genders. We examine this 
latter mechanism given that the question of how much of a role nature plays in 
determining preferences is still considered an open one. 
Behavioral economics has embraced the view that we can use the lens of biology to 
look at economic behavior. In this sense, Burd (2010) argues that much of our economic 
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behavior is the legacy of our adaptation to survival and the reproduction tasks faced by 
our ancestors in natural environments. The biological basis of preferences posits that 
preferences are naturally hardwired on males and females due to hormonal effects that 
take place prenatally. This view that preferences are innately programmed is supported 
by the early appearance of gender differences in young boys and girls. Both males and 
females start off with a brain that “looks” female. However, as Brizendine (2006, pp. 14) 
notes, “a huge testosterone surge beginning in the eighth week will turn this unisex brain 
into male by killing off some cells in the communication centers and growing more cells 
in the sex and aggression centers. If the testosterone surge doesn't happen, the female 
brain continues to grow unperturbed”. 
Scientific evidence on sex differences in the brain have been regularly emerging. 
These variations occur throughout the brain, in regions involved in language, memory, 
emotion, vision, hearing and navigation (Society for Women's Health Research, 2008, 
March 3). Physiologically understanding the relevant sex differences from the expression 
of steroid hormone receptors, to neuronal spines and to the entire brain systems (Becker 
et al., 2008) might be essential in explaining documented gender differences in economic 
decision making contexts. While the question of whether preferences of males and 
females have biological roots is important in the quest of understanding human nature 
and behavior, it may also have policy relevance given that gender differences have been 
observed in important domains including consumption, investment and in the labor 
market.  
In contrast to the “nature” explanation discussed above, Gender Role theory posits 
that males and females learn behavior and attitudes from their peer environment and from 
the overall culture they grow up with. This theory considers non-physical gender 
differences to be a product of socialization. Thus, people internalize gender roles as they 
grow up and perform gendered identities and behaviours as either masculine or feminine. 
Gneezy et al. (2009) provide some evidence that peoples’ preferences are shaped by the 
roles imposed by society.  
Our aim in this study is to explore the role of nature (instead of nurture) in economic 
decision making.  Despite its importance, this topic has received much less attention in 
the literature. No other known study has examined a direct link between hormonal levels 
and non-hypothetically elicited time preferences while the studies that examined 
hormones and risk preferences have not provided consistent results. 
In this study, we examine the effect of prenatal exposure to testosterone and 
estrogen levels and natural fluctuations of two female hormones (progesterone and 
estradiol) on risk and time preferences using a conventional lab experiment. We also 
examine the permanent as well as the temporary differences in behavior. For example, 
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natural fluctuations in hormones during the menstrual cycle might induce short-run 
behavioural deviations. It is also possible that prenatal exposure to testosterone or 
estrogens can induce permanent traits.  
We proxy prenatal exposure to testosterone and estrogen using a biological 
marker, the ratio of the length of the 2nd (index) finger to the 4th (ring) finger of the 
subjects' hand (2D:4D).1 The natural fluctuations of progesterone and estradiol levels are 
proxied by self-reported menstrual cycle information from female subjects in our 
experiment.2 Simply put, with the 2D:4D, we measure a trait that is prenatally determined 
due to testosterone or estrogen exposure. In terms of the menstrual cycle, we measure 
fluctuations of hormonal levels by categorizing females into one of the menstrual phases 
where levels of estradiol and progesterone are expected to be high or low.3 Progesterone 
                                                 
1
 A low  digit ratio is thought to indicate prenatal exposure to high testosterone while a high digit ratio 
indicates prenatal exposure to high estrogen. Sexual dimorphism of the digit ratio was noted since the late 
1800s and has been established in the early 1900s by George (1930). The idea that the digit ratio is a 
marker of prenatal sex hormones has first been speculated in Manning et al. (1998) which observed the 
dimorphism from at least 2 year old children. This was further developed in Manning (2002).  Since then, 
several evidences have established that fetal sex hormone levels cause the sex difference in 2D:4D. For 
example, sex differences in the digit ratio are already observable at the end of the first trimester of fetal 
development (Malas et al., 2006). In addition, right hand 2D:4D at the age of two years was found to be 
negatively correlated with the testosterone/estradiol ratio as measured by amniocentesis in the second 
trimester (Lutchmaya et al., 2004). 
2
 Self-reported measures of menstrual cycle information are likely to suffer from measurement errors. For 
example, in one study women on average overestimated their cycle length by 0.7 days (Jukic et al., 2008). 
However, another study assessed the cycle-phase reliability between self-reports and urine hormonal levels 
and found that they were in fair (but not excellent) agreement (Wojtys et al., 2002). In other studies self-
reported menstrual cycle phases have been confirmed by salivary assay of sex-hormone levels (Ertman et 
al., 2011; Slauterbeck et al., 2002). 
Admittedly, the ease of collection of self-reported menstrual cycle information has made it a popular data 
collection method for determining hormonal levels. Given that the relevant literature relies on reporting 
statistically significant associations from self-reported measures, reporting null results from this study is 
valuable in its own right. As one reviewer noted, reducing measurement errors from self-reported measures 
would entail following up females for a period of time after the experiment, asking them to report the onset 
of menstruation (e.g., in a diary). This is, however, likely to create sample attrition problems which then 
requires bigger samples to start with. 
3
 During a menstrual cycle, a Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) is released first by the 
hypothalamus. This causes a chemical reaction in the pituitary gland and stimulates the production of 
Follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) and Luteinizing hormone (LH). Estrogen, progesterone, and 
testosterone are produced by the ovaries in reaction to stimulation by FSH and LH. Particular menstrual 
cycle phases may not uniquely identify just estradiol or just progesterone since other things happen at the 
same time. For instance, the rise in progesterone is involved in the elevation of body temperature following 
ovulation. Thus, as one reviewer notes, the correlation with hormones may be speculative and while the 
literature is more focused on discussing correlation with hormones, it may be more appropriate to talk 
about correlation with menstrual cycle phases. 
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and estradiol levels fluctuate only for female subjects. Hence, we will be able to tell 
whether females in their low hormonal level phases behave similarly to males or whether 
observed gender differences emerge when estradiol and progesterone are at their highest 
levels. 
In general, our results suggest that neither natural fluctuation in estradiol and 
progesterone levels nor prenatal exposure to testosterone or estrogen has an effect on 
either risk or time preferences. We describe the experiment in the next section and then 
discuss the characteristics of our sample. Estimation procedures and results are discussed 
in section four. We then conclude and discuss our results within the context of the 
relevant literature in the final section. 
 
II. Experimental procedures 
To elicit risk and time preferences, we used the multiple price list procedure 
proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) for risk preferences and by Coller and Williams 
(1999) for discount rates. In the multiple price list procedure, subjects get to choose 
between a left and a right option in a series of ordered list of options. For the discount 
rate task, individuals choose between a principal at a sooner date and a larger amount of 
money at a future date. The list is ordered in increasing order of the amount of money. 
The implied discount rate for the first few pairs of choices is negligible, thus we would 
expect few subjects to choose the future payment. On the other hand, the implied 
discount rate for the last pairs of choices in this ordered list of choices is larger and we 
would expect more subjects to delay payment.  
The intuition is similar for the risk preference task. Choices in this task are 
between lotteries; a safer and a more riskier lottery. Probabilities of lotteries are varied 
along the list so that the list is ordered in increasing order of expected payoffs. For the 
first few rows one option dominates the other in terms of expected payoff while for the 
last few rows this pattern reverses. Thus we would expect risk averse subjects to make 
more safer choices (i.e., choose the left option more often) while risk loving subjects to 
make more riskier choices (i.e., choose the right option more often). 
The risk preference task is essential for our experimental design since it allows us 
to control for the curvature of the utility function. Precise inferences about discount rates 
can only be made once we identify the utility function. Andersen et al. (2008) showed 
that it is essential to have one experimental task for measuring the curvature of the utility 
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function, another task to identify the discount rate conditional on knowing the utility 
function, and then jointly estimate the structural model defined over the parameters of the 
utility function and discount rate4. We varied the order of risk and time preference tasks 
as in Andersen et al. (2011c) to account for order effects (Harrison et al., 2005). 
To reassure subjects about the credibility of the payment from the time 
preferences task, we used a front end delay on the sooner payments.5 This allowed us to 
equalize the credibility of future payments. In addition, payments were promised by a 
permanent faculty member of the university’s department by means of a notarized post-
dated check.6  
A. Description of the experiment 
The conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the Agricultural 
University of Athens and were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 
2004). During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment and the expected earnings 
                                                 
4
 More recently, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) extended the methodology proposed by Andersen et al. 
(2008) by developing a procedure they called the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method that does not require 
a separate risk aversion task to identify the curvature of the utility function. The procedure involves giving 
the subject 100 tokens to allocate between the sooner and later time period, and then varying the exchange 
rate between tokens and money for sooner or later amounts. In our case the exchange rate is the same for 
sooner and later amounts. We opted not to use this procedure since we were also interested in knowing the 
specific effects of key variables on risk preferences. See also Cheung (2012) for a quibble on Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012). 
5
 Front-end delay refers to delaying the sooner payment for the future. A treatment without a front end 
delay refers to the sooner payment being paid in the present. 
6
 As one reviewer pointed out, at the time the experiment was run in Athens, Greece, there was some 
uncertainty about whether Greece would remain in the Euro area. However, any uncertainty would not arise 
due to whether the check could be cashed or not, but rather due to whether the check would be cashed in 
Euros or another currency. We believe that the latter is not an issue. Of course one could argue that the 
purchasing power of another currency would be less than the purchasing power of Euro therefore creating 
an uncertainty in itself. However, there is comparable uncertainty with inflation in post-dated checks that 
we cannot really control in time discounting tasks. This uncertainty is inherent in many decisions in the 
future: e.g., a promised check may never arrive, hyperinflation could render the money worthless or one 
might die before having the chance to spend the money. People weight these probabilities in their decision 
and in this respect our time preference task is not different from other time discounting tasks. Moreover, 
when we estimate a Rank-Dependent, expo-power utility specification with no covariates, we get an 
estimate of the discount rate of  0.171 with a 95% CI of [0.123, 0.219] which is comparable to many other 
studies in the literature (see, for example, Table 6 in Andersen et al., 2011c). Thus, we believe that any 
uncertainty on whether people would really get their money from the banks did not really affect our 
estimates.  
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were not mentioned. However, subjects were told that they will be given the chance to 
make more money during the experiment.7  
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 8 to 11 subjects 
per session. In total, 157 subjects participated in 16 sessions that were conducted between 
May and June 2011. Each session lasted about an hour and subjects were paid a fixed €15 
participation fee. Subjects made on average 1.04€ (S.D.=4.394) in the risk preference 
task and 20.74€ (S.D.=64.787) in the time preference task. Subjects were given a power 
point presentation explaining the risk and time preferences tasks as well as printed copies 
of instructions. Every subject had time to read the instructions at their own pace. 
B. The risk preferences phase  
To elicit risk preferences, we used the multiple price list (MPL) design devised by Holt 
and Laury (2002). In this design each subject is presented with a choice between two 
lotteries, A or B as illustrated in Table 1. In the first row the subject is asked to make a 
choice between lottery A, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance 
of receiving €1.6, and lottery B, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% 
chance of receiving €0.1. The expected value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is 
€0.475, which results in a difference of €1.17 between the expected values of the 
lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the last row, the expected values of the lotteries 
increase but increases much faster for lottery B. 
For each row, a subject chooses A or B and one row is then randomly selected as binding 
for the payout. The last row is a simple test of whether subjects understood the 
instructions correctly.8 In our experiments subjects undertook three risk aversion tasks: 
they made choices from Table 1 (the 1x table), a table where payoffs were scaled up by 6 
(the 6x table) and by 14 (the 14x table).  
Each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and prizes (as in Andersen et 
al., 2011c)9. The order of appearance of the tables for each subject was completely 
randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al., 2005). The 6x and 14x tables served as 
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 Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples that are less risk averse than would 
otherwise have been observed (Harrison et al., 2009). 
8
 19 out of 157 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were dismissed 
from our sample. 
9
 For half of the sessions probabilities where displayed using pie charts, while for the other half 
probabilities where only shown as text. A dummy variable controls for this variation in the experimental 
design. 
7 
 
an elicitation vehicle of risk when larger payoffs are involved.10 Thus, to infer risk 
preferences, subjects were asked to provide 30 binary choices from the risk preference 
task. Example screens are displayed in the appendix. Financial constraints precluded us 
from paying every single subject in each session; subjects were given a 10% chance of 
having their choices realized. 
C. The time preferences phase  
The experimental design for measuring discount rates is based on the experiments 
of Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Andersen et al. 
(2008). Subjects are confronted with payoff  tables similar to Table 2 and they made 
choices from three tables with different time horizons: the 4-month time horizon table, 
the 16-month time horizon table and the 32-month time horizon table.  
In Table 2, option A offers 250€ in 6 months and option B offers 250€ +x € in 38 
months, where x ranged from annual interests rates of 5% to 50% on the principal of 
250€, compounded semi-annualy to be consistent with national banking practices on 
savings accounts. The table also includes the annual and annual effective interest rates to 
facilitate comparisons between lab and field investments (Andersen et al., 2008).  
The tasks provided two future income options instead of one instant and one 
future option. This front-end delay on the early payment has two advantages: it holds the 
transaction costs of future options constant (see Coller & Williams, 1999 for a 
discussion) and it avoids the passion for the present that decision makers exhibit when 
offered monetary amounts today or in the future. It also allows us to equalize the 
credibility of future payments.  
As previously noted, payments were promised by a permanent faculty member of 
the university’s department by means of a notarized post-dated check. A national bank 
served as the third party guarantor as well. 
We varied between subjects the front end delay (3 weeks vs. 6 weeks) and the 
principal of the sooner option (100€ vs. 250€). Table 2 displays a sample payoff matrix 
table with a 32 month time horizon, a 250€ principal and a front end delay of 6 months. 
                                                 
10
 As Drichoutis and Lusk (2012b) note, since the H&L task entails choices made over only four dollar 
amounts, the task reveals little information about the curvature of the utility function. Thus, it is necessary 
to scale up the payoffs to allow for a wider range of dollar amounts, providing more information on the 
shape of the utility function. 
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At the end of the experiment only one choice was randomly drawn as binding. 
Financial constraints precluded us from paying every single subject in each session; 
subjects were given a 10% chance of having their choices realized.11  
D. The post-experiment phase 
At the end of each session subjects completed a questionnaire asking for basic 
demographic information. Female participants were asked about menstrual cycle 
information as displayed in the appendix. They were told that this is an important part of 
the survey and were asked to take all the time they need to answer the questions 
accurately. The questions were adopted from Pearson and Schipper (2013) and Chen et 
al. (2013).  
We also measured the length of the index finger (2nd digit) and ring finger (4th 
digit) of the right hand of the respondents using a ruler. Fingers were measured from the 
crease where the finger joins the hand to the tip of the finger. Measures were taken 
separately by two persons: one of the authors and a research assistant. Both persons were 
trained in measuring the 2nd and 4th digit fingers before the conduct of the experiments. 
We use the ratio of 2D average and 4D average to form the digit ratio. None of the 
subjects refused the measurement of the fingers.12  
 
III. Sample 
The sample consists of 157 students of which 19 had to be dropped since they failed 
to pass a comprehension of lotteries test in the risk preference task, as described in a 
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 Andersen et al. (2011c) varied the probability of payment for the discounting task from 10% to 100% 
and found no significant differences. 
12
 Although many of the studies on digit ratios in the literature scan individuals’ palms and then measure 
distances from pictures, this was considered very invasive and would have raised privacy issues with 
student bodies/organizations in our university.  It could also involve an accurate imprint of subjects’ 
fingerprints. Fingerprints are considered private data in the country; even the national police do not keep a 
record of non-active fingerprints. 
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previous section.13 Of the remaining 138 subjects, 10 indicated using oral 
contraceptives.14 None of the female subjects was pregnant. 
Table 3 presents the distribution across menstrual cycle phases before and after 
sample attrition. Although we use the sample of 138 students for estimating risk and time 
preferences, it is useful to look at the distribution of the menstrual phases of the sample 
of female students before we consider dropping some of them from the sample. The 
distribution shown in Table 3 assumes that all females in our sample follow a cycle of 29-
days. In contrast to common beliefs, the average duration of a cycle is 29 days (Chiazze 
et al., 1968; Fehring et al., 2006) and not 28 days as previous studies have assumed. 
Average duration of a cycle for females younger than 35 is  29 days but this drops to an 
average of 28 days for females older than 35 years old (Fehring et al., 2006). Thus, 
considering the age of our sample of students, a 29-day cycle is more appropriate to 
assume. 
The menstrual cycle can be divided into several different phases. The follicular phase 
(days 1 to 16) can be further divided into the menstrual phase (days 1 to 5)15, the 
                                                 
13
 Out of the 19 persons dropped for choosing the dominated option in the risk preference task, 15 were 
female. Given that there were more female participants than male participants in our experiment (58.6% vs. 
41.4%), the dropped observations correspond to 6.15% of males and 16.30% of females. Fisher’s exact test 
of whether taking the dominated option differs between males and females does not reject the null at the 
5% level (p-value=0.080).  
14
 In our sample, 12 out of 92 females (13.04%) use some kind of hormonal contraceptive. This largely 
depicts the picture on preventive policies in Greece. Greece has one of the highest rates of abortions in 
Europe (one in ten women in the 16-24 age group) which indicates that women continue to rely on abortion 
to control births (Ioannidi-Kapolou, 2004). According to a 2001 national household survey only about 5% 
of women take hormonal pills (Tountas et al., 2004). The 13% rate in our study seems like an improvement 
as compared to the 2001 figure. 
A second issue pointed out by a reviewer is whether the “pill takers” group can actually be grouped 
together in our analysis. First, given the small size of the group and given that the results hardly change 
when including or excluding pill takers in our estimations, we believe that for this particular dataset we can 
safely group together the pill takers. Second, in the Greek market, popular hormonal contraceptives form a 
rather homogeneous group with few exceptions. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that for 7 out of 9 pills a 
21-day intake is followed by a 7-day break while another one is very close to that particular intake period 
(Gracial; 22-day intake, 6-day break). The only outlier is a relatively new quadriphasic pill (Qlaira) which 
involves a 26-day intake period. To confirm which brand our subjects use, we asked, through a web survey 
in December 2012, the 12 female subjects to recall which pill they were using at the time of the experiment. 
The distribution of responses was as follows: Yasmin (1 subject), Yasminelle (10 subjects) and Mercilon (1 
subject). These pills release about the same doses of estrogen (ethinylestradiol) with a 7-day break 
following a 21-day intake period. Thus we can safely assume that the pill takers group forms a relatively 
homogeneous group in our study. In addition, none of the results changes when we exclude pill takers from 
the estimations.   
15
 Duration for the follicular phase and the menstrual phase are average durations reported by several 
studies reviewed in Table 2 in Fehring et al. (2006). 
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proliferative phase (days 6 to 14) and the ovulatory phase (days 15 to 16)16. The secretory 
phase lasts about 13 days (days 17 to 29) on average (see Fehring et al., 2006) and can be 
divided into the luteal phase (days 17 to 24) and the premenstrual phase (days 25 to 29)17. 
Females that use hormonal contraceptives do not have a natural menstrual cycle since 
their circulating levels of hormones may differ from naturally cycling women; hence they 
are treated as a separate group.  
Table 3 also indicates the expected number of subjects if we assume that the 
probability of participation does not vary over the cycle (pill takers are excluded from 
this calculation)18. A χ2 goodness of fit test allows us to test whether the observed 
proportions for the observed distribution differ from hypothesized proportions. We find 
that we cannot reject equality of distributions for the full sample (χ2=4.7, p-value=0.320) 
and even for the sample after attrition (χ2=4.06, p-value=0.398). Thus selective 
participation in the experiment due to menstruating female subjects staying away is not a 
significant problem with our data.  Dropping observations does not also significantly 
affect the observed distribution of menstrual phases. 
The assumption of a 29-day cycle is a restrictive one since subjects in our sample 
exhibit significant variation in cycle length. The average duration in our sample is 28.7 
days with a standard deviation of 2.43. However, we can use the collected cycle length 
information to construct individualized menstrual cycle phases as in Pearson and 
Schipper (2013). Since the length of the secretory phase is relatively fixed (it usually 
exhibits less variation as compared to the proliferative phase as shown in Fehring et al. 
(2006)), we consider adjusting the length of the proliferative phase only. The procedure is 
similar to Pearson and Schipper (2013) and more details are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 3 exhibits the distribution across adjusted menstrual cycle phases which we use 
for all further analysis. Note that this distribution is not in sharp contrast with unadjusted 
menstrual cycle phases. In fact, Pearson and Schipper (2013) found that their results 
remain robust when using adjusted phases as controls.  
As previously discussed, the fingers for the digit ratios were measured by two 
researchers. We use the ratio of the average 2D and average 4D in the analysis. To 
examine the effect of the digit ratio on risk and time preferences, we first normalized the 
                                                 
16
 Duration for the proliferative phase is derived as residual of the follicular phase after subtracting the 
menstrual and ovulatory phases. The ovulatory phase is usually taken to last 2-days which corresponds to 
the high fertility window in Figure 1 in Fehring et al. (2006). 
17
 The secretory phase is often referred to as the luteal phase and includes the premenstrual phase. 
18
 For example, for the menstrual phase there should be [5 days x (N female subjects – n Pill takers)]/29 
days cycle length ≈ 14 subjects. 
11 
 
digit ratios into z-scores by subtracting off the sample mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation. With this transformation, the 2D:4D coefficient estimates reveal the effect of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the digit ratio on risk and time preferences. 
Figure 2 shows the kernel densities of the distribution of digit ratios by sex. It is 
obvious that the distribution for males is shifted to the left, implying lower digit ratios 
than females. A t-test confirms Figure 2. Females have a mean digit ratio of 1.025 while 
males have a mean digit ratio of 1.002. The difference is statistically significant (t=2.598, 
p-value=0.010). 
IV. Estimation and results 
Each subject in our experiment responded to 60 binary tasks (30 for the risk 
preference tasks and 30 for the time preference tasks). Dropping data from subjects who 
chose lottery A over lottery B in the last row of Table 1 resulted in a sample size of 138 
subjects, with 4140 risk aversion choices and 4140 discount rate choices. Figures A1 to 
A18 in the Appendix show the proportion of choices for each decision in the risk or time 
preference tasks by menstrual phase, progesterone/estradiol level, and digit ratio group. 
A. OLS regressions 
A simple way to look for some patterns in our data is to regress the number of A 
choices (i.e., choosing the left option in each choice) on our variables of interest. This 
comes with some caveats. First, since we did not impose monotonicity on choices (i.e., 
constrain subjects to switch only once across a given table), multiple switching occurred. 
While our structural econometric methods (presented momentarily) can accommodate 
this behavior, we have to drop these observations in an OLS regression. Second, one has 
to essentially estimate a separate regression for each task unless one is willing to sacrifice 
a lot of observations in favor of a model that uses only the observations that overlap. 
In Table 4 we show OLS regression results where we regress the number of A 
choices on the treatment variables and a male dummy.19 The first three columns show 
results for each of the risk preference tasks, while the last three columns show results 
from the three time preference tasks. We avoid pooling the data together because this 
would dramatically reduce the sample size. As shown, gender differences are apparent for 
risk preferences while no effect appears for time preferences. In particular, males switch 
                                                 
19
 The dummy variables in this and subsequent tables signify the treatments consistent with their names. 
Visual is a dummy for the treatment where probabilities were visualized using pie charts, Task Order 
signifies the order of the risk and time preferences tasks (1 if risk preference task was first), FED is a 
dummy for the front end delay (1 if FED was 6 weeks) and Principal is a dummy for the amount in the 
sooner option in the time preference task (1 if the sooner option is 250€). 
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earlier to choice B in the x1 and x9 risk preference task (which effectively establishes 
males as less risk averse). Note that the principal is statistically significant for all time 
preference tasks signaling that a higher principal causes subjects to switch earlier to 
choice B. 
In order to explore the role of menstrual cycle on risk and time preferences, we 
use dummies that indicate one of the five phases of the cycle of our female subjects. The 
omitted variable is males, so that all comparisons are with respect to male subjects. Table 
5 shows results with and without pill takers for each task separately (models (1) to (6) 
refer to the risk preference tasks while models (7) to (12) refer to the time preference 
tasks). Results are fairly robust to the inclusion/exclusion of pill takers. Some statistically 
significant results emerge for the x1 risk preference task. However, these do not carry 
over to the x9 and x14 tasks. In particular, it looks as if females in the luteal and 
proliferative phase switch later to choice B as compared to male subjects (indicating 
higher risk aversion). In addition, females in the ovulatory phase switch earlier to choice 
B in the 16 week interval time preference task indicating increased patience. However, 
the effect does not carry over to the other time preference tasks. The principal is 
statistically significant across all week intervals. 
Another way to analyze the data with menstrual cycle information (also taken by 
Buser, 2012) is to divide female subjects into high-estradiol and low-estradiol, as well as, 
high-progesterone and low-progesterone subjects. The high estradiol phase corresponds 
to cycle phases two and four while the high progesterone phase coincides with the fourth 
phase. Table 6 shows the parameter estimates when we replaced the menstrual cycle 
dummies of Table 5 with dummies that indicate high progesterone/estradiol levels. As 
shown in Table 6, none of the relevant variables is consistently statistically significant 
across the tasks. 
As mentioned previously, we use the digit ratio to explore the role of prenatal 
exposure to testosterone and estrogen on risk and time preferences. Recent work on the 
relationship between testosterone and risk-taking suggests that the effect can be nonlinear 
(Garbarino et al., 2011; Sapienza et al., 2009). One way to model this non-linearity is to 
add a squared term of the digit ratio as a covariate; a second approach is to divide males 
and females into quartiles. Thus we also created gender specific dummies based on the 
25th and 75th quartile. Subjects on the 25th quartile of their same gender distribution 
were categorized into the low digit ratio group; subjects above the 75th quartile of their 
same gender distribution were classified into the high digit ratio group. The remaining 
subjects (i.e., between the 25th and 75th quartile) formed the medium digit ratio group. 
As shown in Table 7, digit ratios do not seem to systematically affect risk or time 
preferences. The largest effect we observe is for the 4 week interval time preference task, 
where subjects with medium or high digit ratios switch earlier to choice B as compared to 
low digit ratio subjects. The effect is absent for the 16 and 32 week interval. 
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B. Joint estimation of risk and time preferences 
 As noted before, the OLS approach is rather restrictive in nature since we cannot 
accommodate behavioral errors that may emerge during the choice process (e.g., the 
multiple switching behavior observed in our data). We address this issue by adopting a 
joint estimation framework of risk and time preferences. Our structural approach follows 
closely the framework of Andersen et al. (2008), so we will only repeat the basic 
information here. Andersen et al. (2008) discussed in detail how to put parametric 
structure on the identification of risk and time preferences, the theoretical issues 
involved, and the statistical specification. 
 Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification: 
  1
1
rMU M
r

           (1) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. In (1), r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 
denotes risk aversion behavior and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior. 
 In addition, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices 
over risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential, then the subject is indifferent 
between two income options tM  and tM  if and only if: 
     
1
1t t
U M U M            (2) 
where  tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  for delivery at time t, δ is the 
discount rate, τ is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome at time t+τ, and 
the utility function is separable and stationary over time20. δ is the discount rate that 
equalizes the present value of the two monetary outcomes in the indifference condition 
(2). 
The binary choices of the subjects in the risk preference tasks can be explained by 
different CRRA coefficients. For example, a subject that made four safe choices (i.e., 
choosing option A) and then switched to option B would have revealed a CRRA interval 
of -0.15 to 0.40. The intervals are reported in Table 1. Similarly, the binary choices in the 
time preference tasks can be explained by different discount rates. A subject that chose 
                                                 
20
 The assumption that the utility function is additively separable implicitly imposes intertemporal risk 
neutrality. For a relaxation of this assumption see Andersen et al. (2011a). Andersen et al. (2011a) find that 
relaxing the assumption of intertemporal risk neutrality leads to comparable results with their earlier results 
in Andersen et al. (2008) that assumed intertemporal risk neutrality. In addition, since our primary purpose 
is to check whether biological indices have an effect on risk and time preferences, imposing or relaxing the 
assumption of intertemporal risk neutrality would make little difference when comparing different groups 
of people. 
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300€ in 1 month would have revealed a discount rate higher than  /300 100%x  ; otherwise 
she would have revealed an annual discount rate of  /300 100%x   or less. 
Andersen et al. (2008) explicitly write the likelihood function for the choices that 
subjects make in these tasks and jointly estimate the risk parameter r and the discount 
rate δ. The contribution to the overall likelihood from the risk aversion responses can be 
written for each lottery i as: 
    
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

   (3) 
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the 
experimenter (i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table 1). To specify the likelihoods 
conditional on the model, a stochastic specification from Holt and Laury (2002) is used. 
The expected utility (EU) for each lottery pair is calculated for the candidate estimate of r 
and the ratio: 
 
   
exp
exp exp
B
A B
EU
EU
EU EU

     (4) 
is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to options A and B respectively, and μ is a 
structural noise parameter used to allow some errors. The index in (4) is linked to 
observed choices by specifying that the option B is chosen when 12EU  . Wilcox 
(2011) proposed the “contextual error” specification whereas instead of the latent index 
in (4), we have: 
 
   
exp
exp exp
B
A B
EU c
EU
EU c EU c

        (5) 
In (5) c is a new normalizing term for each lottery pair A and B. The normalizing 
term is defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the 
minimum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair. Since the value of c varies between 
lottery choices, it is said to be “contextual.” Contextual utility basically accounts for 
lottery specific heteroskedasticity. Drichoutis and Lusk (2012a) have shown that different 
error specifications, with and without accounting for contextual utility, produce strikingly 
different results in models of individual decision making under risk. They also show that 
certain model fit criteria can be used to identify the model that best fits the data. In our 
case, the Luce error story that accounts for contextual utility provides the best model fit 
with our data. 
The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
        ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1RA i i
i
L r y EU y EU y       X  (6) 
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Where yi=1(-1) denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task i. 
Subjects were allowed to express indifference between choices and were told that if that 
choice was selected to be played out, the computer would randomly choose one of the 
two options for them and that both choices had equal chances of being selected.21 Thus 
the likelihood for these choices can be modified such that choices imply a 50/50 mixture 
of the likelihood of choosing either lottery: 
 
     
   
ln | 1 ln 1 | 1
ln , ; , 1 1ln ln 1 | 0
2 2
i i
RA
i i
EU y EU y
L r y
EU EU y

                    
X   (7) 
The conditional log-likelihood for the time preference task can be written in a 
similar manner if we write the discounted utility of each option as: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
11
r
B
B
MPV
r

     (8) 
and the index of the present values as: 
 
   
exp
exp exp
B
A B
PV
PV
PV PV

           (9) 
where ν is a noise parameter for the discount rate tasks22. The log-likelihood will then be: 
 
     
   
ln | 1 ln 1 | 1
ln , , ; , 1 1ln ln 1 | 0
2 2
i i
DR
i i
PV y PV y
L r y
PV PV y
 
                    
X   (10) 
and the joint likelihood will be: 
     ln , , , ; , ln , ; , ln , , ; ,RA DRL r y L r y L r y      X X X     (11) 
Each parameter in equation (11) can be allowed to be a linear function of 
treatment effects and/or demographic variables. Equation (11) can be maximized using 
                                                 
21
 Although we allowed indifference between choices in the risk and time preferences tasks, it is still 
possible that subjects displayed multiple switches between options. We did not impose monotonicity on 
choices or provide warnings when monotonicity was violated. Although such a procedure could be 
implemented, it is unclear if it is superior to simply observing how people behave when unconstrained. We 
do not consider multiple switching as much of an issue either. Data displaying local intransitivity are 
modeled as they are, resulting in the standard error on the utility functions being a little bigger than if they 
had been transitive. In addition, when we pool these data together with data from subjects that do not 
display intransitivity, it should not affect estimates too much, while still recognizing that this is an 
imprecise estimate for that particular subject. According to Fisher’s exact tests, we find no evidence that 
number of multiple switching differs among males and females as well.  
22
 Contextual utility correction does not need to be applied for these choices since these are over 
deterministic outcomes. 
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standard numerical methods. We used the routines made available as a supplemental 
material in Andersen et al. (2008) with appropriate modifications. For a more thorough 
and pedagogical treatise on maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions, see 
Appendix F in Harrison and Rutstrom (2008). The statistical specification also takes into 
account the multiple responses given by the same subject and allows for correlation 
between responses of the same subject (clustered standard errors). Standard errors were 
computed using the delta method. 
There are several extensions to the above specifications that we consider. For 
example the exponential discounting model is just one of the discounting functions out of 
a menagerie of discounting functions (Andersen et al., 2011c). We can test for the 
robustness of the results by considering an alternative discounting function assumed by 
hyperbolic discounting models23. Others have found that results are generally robust 
when considering the choice between an exponential discounting model and hyperbolic 
discounting (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008). 
When considering a hyperbolic discounting function, one would need to replace (8) with: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
1 1
r
B
B
MPV
k r

      (12) 
for 0k  .  
In addition, the specifications above have only assumed Expected Utility for risk. 
Since the Allais paradoxes (Allais, 1953) for EUT and the Nobel-prize winning work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we know that EUT often fails and that one must account 
for probability weighting especially when using smaller scale payoffs. Rank Dependent 
Utility (Quiggin, 1982) extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights on 
lottery outcomes. To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility 
defined by (3) with: 
        
1,2 1,2
i j j j j
j j
EU w p M U M w U M
 
         (13) 
where      2 2 1 1 11w w p p w p w p      and  1 1w w p , with outcomes ranked from 
worst (outcome 2) to best (outcome 1) and  w   is some weighting function. We adopt 
the weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which has been 
extensively used in the literature and assumes weights of the form: 
    11w p p p p              (14) 
                                                 
23
 As discussed in Andersen et al. (2008), the use of the quasi-hyperbolic specification is not possible due 
to the existence of a front end delay in our tasks. 
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 In (14), when 1  , it implies that w(p)=p and this serves as a formal test of the 
hypothesis of no probability weighting.  
Finally, the assumption of a CRRA function, implicitly assumes that risk aversion is 
constant across different prize domains. We can relax this assumption by adapting a more 
flexible form, the hybrid expo-power function of Saha (1993). The expo-power function 
can be defined as     11 exp /ru M aM a   , where M is income and α and r are 
parameters to be estimated. Relative risk aversion (RRA) is then   11 rr a r M   , so RRA 
varies with income if 0a  . The expo-power function nests CRRA (as α→0). 
C. Results of joint estimation 
Table 8 shows basic estimates when assuming a CRRA utility function and EUT 
under both exponential and hyperbolic discounting (models (1) and (2) respectively). 
Gender differences emerge (statistically significant at the 10% level) for risk and time 
preferences. Males have higher discount rates and are less risk averse than females. In 
addition, the principal has a direct effect on discount rates. This is consistent with the 
magnitude effect (Andersen et al., 2011b) wherein higher discount rates are inferred from 
choices made with lower principals.24 Results are virtually identical when assuming 
either hyperbolic or exponential discounting. Hence, the choice of the discounting 
function seems not relevant, at least with our data. To simplify the estimations that 
follow, we only use the exponential discounting model. 
The third column in Table 8 (model (3)) generalizes model (1) by allowing for RDU 
and an expo-power function under exponential discounting. We can directly test whether 
RDU and/or the expo-power function is appropriate by testing whether γ=1 and/or α=0. 
Since all the covariates used are dummies we need to test for several linear combinations 
of the coefficients. For example, we can test for 0 1 2 0Gender a Visual     or for 
0 2 3 0a Visual a TaskOrder    . All of these tests reject the null, thus rendering support 
for an expo-power function. In addition, the corresponding tests for γ=1 reject the null in 
all cases as well, thus rendering support for RDU. Joint significance tests for γ=1 and α=0 
also reject the null. 
 Table 9 shows parameter estimates under RDU, expo-power and exponential 
discounting for three models that try to capture the effect of menstrual cycle. Models (1) 
and (2) use menstrual cycle dummies (excluding and including pill takers respectively) 
                                                 
24
 Andersen et al. (2011b) note that with some exceptions, all evidence of the magnitude effect occur in 
samples of college-age students (see Andersen et al. (2011c) for an exception). They observe only a small 
statistically significant magnitude effect in the discounting behavior of their sample of adult Danes. 
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while model (3) uses progesterone and estradiol dummies. Wald tests indicate that we 
reject the null that α=0 or the null that γ=1 or the null that α=0  and γ=1 for all three 
models. Thus, there is support for RDU and expo-power. 
As evident, the only significant variable is the luteal phase dummy for the α 
parameter. However, since we might be more interested on the effect of this variable on 
RRA, one needs to evaluate marginal changes of the respective variables on the 
expression   11 rr a r M   .25  Table A2 in the appendix shows that none of these 
marginal changes for each of the menstrual cycle dummies is statistically different from 
zero.  
Figure 3 illustrates RRA predictions for the range of prizes given at the 
experiment using model (3) of Table 9. RRA increases across the prize domain. 
However, predictions for males and female subjects irrespective of their 
estradiol/progesterone level are similar. All subjects exhibit higher risk aversion at higher 
incomes.  
Similarly, null results emerge in Table 10 when using the same digit ratio 
variables we used in the OLS regressions. None of the variables is statistically 
significant. Wald tests support the use of an expo-power utility function and RDU. Table 
A2 in the appendix shows that none of the marginal changes associated with the digit 
ratio variables is statistically different from zero. Figure 4 illustrates RRA predictions for 
the range of prizes given at the experiment using model (2) of Table 10. There is no 
indication that RRA differs among males or females classified under different digit ratio 
groups. Thus we conclude that there is no effect of the digit ratio on elicited discount 
rates and risk preferences. 
D. Multiple test procedures 
Given the number of parameters estimated in each of the expo-power/RDU 
specifications and some scattered significant results, one may wonder about the 
probability of not observing at least one statistically significant difference. This 
probability tends to fall with number of parameters, even if all null hypotheses are true. 
Multiple test procedures can then be used that calculate a corrected overall critical p-
value such that an individual null hypothesis is considered to be acceptable only if its 
corresponding p-value is greater than the corrected overall critical p-value. Several 
                                                 
25
 For a dummy variable this would simply correspond in calculating the expression ΔRRA=RRA1-RRA0 
where RRA1 is simply the RRA value for when the respective dummy takes the value of 1 and RRA0 is the 
RRA value for when the respective dummy takes the value of zero. For a continuous covariate x the 
appropriate expression is given by:  1 2 11 1 (1 ) (1 )r rRRA r aalfaM r M r Mx x x             . 
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methods can be used to calculate the corrected p-value (Newson and the ALSPAC study 
team (2003) offer an exposition and Stata implementation). We used the Bonferroni 
method although results remain unchanged with alternative methods. 
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the results of this multiple test procedure applied 
to each of the models in Tables 9 and 11. As shown, most corresponding p-values are 
greater than the overall critical p-value which indicates that the null hypothesis of no 
effect for the variables of interest is credible. Thus, we safely conclude that neither the 
menstrual cycle variables nor the digit ratio variables have any effect on estimated 
discount rates or any of the risk parameters. The only null hypothesis that is not credible 
is the one associated with the principal variable. This supports the result that the 
magnitude effect we observe is credible. 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
The issue of whether preferences of males and females have biological roots is 
relevant given that gender differences have been observed in important domains of 
economic decision making including consumption, investment and in the labor market.  
Knowledge about the possible biological underpinnings of people’s preferences and how 
these factors influence differences in behavior between genders can be used to further 
illuminate the debate on gender-specific market outcomes and provide some important 
insights into the biology of people’s risk and time preferences. This is important in our 
quest of understanding human nature as well. The findings however of the studies that 
examined the relationship between hormones and risk preferences have been mixed and 
no other known study has really examined the direct link between hormonal levels and 
non-hypothetically elicited time preferences. Hence, given the generally scant literature 
but increasing interest in this area of research, we attempted to examine the biological 
roots of people’s risk and time preferences by exploring if observed gender differences 
can be explained by (a) natural fluctuations in progesterone and estradiol levels during 
the menstrual cycle and by (b) prenatal exposure to testosterone or estrogen levels.   
We elicited risk and time preferences using two popular experimental tasks. After 
fitting simple OLS regression models, we jointly estimated the parameters of interest 
using a structural econometrics model. First we find that observed differences in 
aggregate gender effects can be sensitive to the functional forms assumed. Indeed, when 
we used a more flexible functional form for the utility (the expo-power) function and 
allowed for probability weighting for the risk choices (rank-dependent utility), the gender 
differences in risk and time preferences, as captured by a gender dummy, disappeared.  
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The second thing our results suggest is that none of the variables of interest robustly 
affects risk or time preferences. While we do observe some scattered statistically 
significant results, we find that none of the results stands this scrutiny when we employ 
multiple testing procedures.  
Our (null) results for time discounting contrast with two studies from the literature 
(Millet & Dewitte, 2008; Takahashi et al., 2012) that find statistically significant effects. 
However, both studies were hypothetical and the evidence on hypothetical biases in 
hypothetical surveys is overwhelming (see for example footnote 35 in Andersen et al., 
2011c and citations therein). 
Results from the risk preference literature are rather mixed. On the one hand, studies 
such as Schipper (2011) found no significant correlation between risk aversion and the 
menstrual cycle or the digit ratio. Similarly, Apicella et al. (2008) and Sapienza et al. 
(2009) did not find a statistically significant relation with the digit ratio. In contrast, other 
studies find significant correlations with the digit ratio. For example, results from 
Garbarino et al. (2011), Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) and Dreber and Hoffman 
(2007) imply that lower digit ratios are associated with higher risk taking.26 Therefore, 
our study reinforces the strand of results indicating a null finding.27 
We posit that our null results are not due to sample size since our sample size is 
comparable to other studies that find statistically significant results. For example, 
Garbarino et al. (2011) use a sample size of 152, Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) 
analyze data from 188 subjects and Dreber and Hoffman (2007) have 147 subjects in 
their sample. Although Apicella et al. (2008) reports results from a smaller sample size 
(98 subjects) as compared to the rest of the studies, Schipper (2011) collected data from 
as much as 208 subjects, the largest sample size from the above cited studies. Yet, he 
fails to reject the null as well. 
On the methodological front, while we have been very careful in collecting hormonal 
measures based on menstrual cycle information and digit ratios, it is still possible that 
these measures could suffer measurement errors. While there are other ways to more 
accurately measure hormones such as with blood or saliva samples, these procedures 
have their own problems as well. For example, blood draws may scare away risk-averse 
people or could create expectations that affect hormonal levels.  Moreover, while 
                                                 
26
 Since the digit ratio is sexual dimorphic and could vary between ethnicities, we should note that Dreber 
and Hoffman (2007) used a racially homogeneous sample while Apicella et al. (2008) and Sapienza et al. 
(2009)  did not. In addition, Apicella et al. (2008) report results from an all-male sample while Sapienza et 
al. (2009) do find a marginally statistically significant effect for the female sub-sample alone. 
27
 Two  more studies (Coates et al., 2009 ; Coates & Page, 2009)  report associations between digit ratios 
and performance of professional male traders from a trade floor in London but risk is only implicitly 
assumed from traders’ performance and not directly measured. 
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hormones can be more accurately measured in blood than in saliva, steroid hormones in 
blood are not necessarily free to act on receptors. In addition, hormones such as LH or the 
FSH cannot be measured in saliva but in blood. Even methods that exogenously vary 
hormones (e.g., testosterone administration) may not be feasible in many situations, not 
to mention the sensitivity and challenge of getting institutional approvals for such 
procedures.  
Our study adds to the scant literature of null results and contributes against the 
positive-results bias. As the literature piles up, meta-analysis methods can help to contrast 
and combine results from different studies, in the hope of identifying patterns and sources 
of disagreement that will advance the literature on the biology of risk and time 
preferences. 
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Table 1. Sample payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiments 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6  0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71 
0.2 2 0.8 1.6  0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95 
0.3 2 0.7 1.6  0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49 
0.4 2 0.6 1.6  0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2 0.5 1.6  0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6  0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6  0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6  0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6  0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6  1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not 
shown to subjects. 
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Table 2. Payoff table for 32 month horizon in discount rate experiments 
Payoff alternative 
Payment option A 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 6 month)
Payment option B in 
€ 
(Pays amount below 
in 38 months) 
Annual interest 
rate in % 
Annual 
effective 
interest rate in 
% 
1 250 257.78 5 4.5 
2 250 265.56 10 9 
3 250 273.33 15 13.5 
4 250 281.11 20 18 
5 250 288.89 25 22.5 
6 250 296.67 30 27 
7 250 304.44 35 31.5 
8 250 312.22 40 36 
9 250 320.00 45 40.5 
10 250 327.78 50 45 
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Table 3. Participation by menstrual cycle phases 
Menstrual cycle 
phases 
Days Full sample Sample after attrition Expected 
percentage 
of subjects 
  29-
days 
cycle 
Expected 
number 
of 
subjects 
29-
days 
cycle 
Expected 
number 
of 
subjects 
Adjusted  
Menstrual phase 1-5 8 14 8 10 12 17% 
Proliferative phase 6-14 22 25 17 18 21 31% 
Ovulatory phase 15-16 7 6 7 4 5 7% 
Luteal phase 17-24 25 22 20 16 18 28% 
Pre-menstrual phase 25-29 18 14 15 10 12 17% 
Hormonal 
contraceptives  12 - 10 - 10 - 
Total  92  77  77  
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Table 4. OLS regressions on number of A choices with male dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
x1 x9 x14 4 weeks 16 weeks 32 weeks 
Visual -0.454 0.377 0.339    
(0.408) (0.384) (0.393)    
Task Order -0.300 -0.105 -0.145 0.966* 0.872* 0.513 
(0.404) (0.371) (0.390) (0.533) (0.480) (0.496) 
Male -1.206** -0.644* -0.279 -0.291 0.369 0.681 
(0.415) (0.378) (0.386) (0.569) (0.464) (0.492) 
FED    0.354 0.158 0.138 
   (0.541) (0.475) (0.501) 
Principal    -1.671** -1.465** -1.283** 
   (0.547) (0.472) (0.488) 
Constant 6.307** 6.419** 6.649** 8.524** 8.162** 8.215** 
(0.396) (0.411) (0.391) (0.647) (0.489) (0.496) 
N 95 108 124 95 108 123 
Adj. R-sq. 0.072 0.009 -0.014 0.073 0.088 0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 5. OLS regressions on number of A choices with menstrual cycle dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  x1 x1 x9 x9 x14 x14 4 weeks 4 weeks 16 weeks 16 weeks 32 weeks 32 weeks 
Visual -0.359 -0.483 0.469 0.482 0.629* 0.588* 
  (0.432) (0.422) (0.396) (0.382) (0.357) (0.355) 
Task Order -0.196 -0.236 -0.242 -0.183 -0.300 -0.270 0.975 0.955* 1.172** 1.118** 0.618 0.547 
  (0.431) (0.417) (0.398) (0.386) (0.391) (0.392) (0.588) (0.566) (0.528) (0.515) (0.532) (0.513) 
Menstrual -0.017 -0.036 1.193* 1.299** 1.063 1.427* 1.184 1.140 -1.234 -1.037 0.448 -0.711 
  (1.350) (1.336) (0.657) (0.616) (0.855) (0.784) (0.731) (0.755) (1.215) (1.106) (0.916) (1.257) 
Proliferative 1.340** 1.324** 1.147** 0.964 1.247** 0.764 0.666 0.193 0.286 0.303 0.066 0.217 
  (0.648) (0.632) (0.573) (0.595) (0.541) (0.596) (0.982) (0.936) (0.611) (0.566) (0.731) (0.697) 
Ovulatory 2.024* 2.026* 0.276 0.273 -0.255 -0.260 0.699 0.803 -2.528** -2.539** -1.646 -1.688 
  (1.033) (1.034) (0.687) (0.697) (0.787) (0.783) (1.375) (1.369) (1.056) (1.055) (1.260) (1.272) 
Luteal 1.497** 1.648** 0.624 0.761 0.781* 0.997** 0.117 0.363 -0.143 -0.150 -1.123 -0.964 
  (0.486) (0.491) (0.548) (0.533) (0.401) (0.418) (0.840) (0.799) (0.848) (0.805) (0.812) (0.788) 
Pre-menstrual 0.944 0.666 0.352 0.304 -1.379 -1.364* -0.742 -0.499 -0.104 -0.227 -0.785 -0.695 
  (0.698) (0.671) (0.750) (0.700) (0.840) (0.788) (1.224) (1.112) (0.983) (0.921) (0.822) (0.789) 
Pill  -0.466  -0.670  -0.437  0.422  0.435  -0.183 
   (0.851)  (0.923)  (1.052)  (0.839)  (0.662)  (1.115) 
FED 0.470 0.451 0.071 -0.020 0.205 0.121 
  (0.592) (0.571) (0.501) (0.478) (0.520) (0.515) 
Principal -1.528** -1.733** -1.323** -1.361** -1.340** -1.224** 
  (0.634) (0.604) (0.498) (0.466) (0.480) (0.475) 
Constant 5.004** 5.083** 5.805** 5.768** 6.300** 6.305** 8.099** 8.215** 8.354** 8.449** 8.834** 8.857** 
(0.423) (0.416) (0.381) (0.374) (0.399) (0.400) (0.635) (0.617) (0.539) (0.514) (0.592) (0.578) 
N 88 95 100 108 115 124 88 95 100 108 114 123 
Adj. R-sq. 0.058 0.065 -0.004 -0.018 0.085 0.067 0.033 0.034 0.110 0.109 0.069 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05
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Table 6. OLS regressions on number of A choices with progesterone, estradiol dummies, including pill takers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
x1 x9 x14 4 weeks 16 weeks 32 weeks 
Visual -0.427 0.418 0.406 
(0.407) (0.372) (0.374) 
Task Order -0.234 -0.043 -0.007 1.003* 0.973* 0.502 
(0.413) (0.371) (0.385) (0.558) (0.520) (0.515) 
Estradiol 1.063* 0.747 0.888 0.170 0.684 0.576 
(0.586) (0.562) (0.595) (0.870) (0.549) (0.676) 
Progesterone 0.333 -0.175 0.272 0.153 -0.468 -1.201 
(0.630) (0.693) (0.649) (0.970) (0.807) (0.880) 
Pill -0.323 -0.486 -0.353 0.281 0.359 -0.385 
(0.775) (0.881) (1.053) (0.732) (0.589) (1.222) 
FED 0.326 0.154 0.201 
(0.541) (0.479) (0.501) 
Principal -1.691** -1.482** -1.269** 
(0.562) (0.467) (0.477) 
Constant 5.289** 5.923** 6.122** 8.286** 8.111** 8.540** 
(0.423) (0.335) (0.365) (0.597) (0.531) (0.546) 
N 95 108 124 95 108 123 
Adj. R-sq. 0.051 -0.012 0.017 0.053 0.077 0.032 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 7. OLS regressions on number of A choices with digit ratio squared term and digit ratio quartiles 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  x1 x1 x9 x9 x14 x14 4 weeks 4 weeks 16 weeks 16 weeks 32 weeks 32 weeks 
Visual -0.426 -0.430 0.390 0.376 0.373 0.304 
  (0.408) (0.403) (0.382) (0.385) (0.394) (0.395)             
Task Order -0.390 -0.325 -0.151 -0.137 -0.140 -0.128 1.145** 1.077* 0.823* 0.825* 0.516 0.537 
  (0.410) (0.402) (0.384) (0.383) (0.392) (0.392) (0.555) (0.545) (0.492) (0.488) (0.501) (0.498) 
Male -1.001** -1.143** -0.628 -0.601 -0.353 -0.288 -0.604 -0.369 0.488 0.432 0.665 0.658 
  (0.428) (0.403) (0.408) (0.388) (0.405) (0.395) (0.584) (0.547) (0.522) (0.493) (0.517) (0.502) 
2D:4D 0.394* 0.094 -0.148 -0.612** 0.195 -0.042 
  (0.221)   (0.205)   (0.205)   (0.303)   (0.264)   (0.263)   
(2D:4D)2 -0.066 -0.139 -0.049 0.141 -0.017 0.004 
  (0.134)   (0.125)   (0.132)   (0.180)   (0.161)   (0.169)   
Medium  0.646 0.332 -0.382 -1.585** 0.394 -0.679 
 2D:4D   (0.491)   (0.473)   (0.474)   (0.655)   (0.613)   (0.608) 
High 1.384** 0.579 -0.065 -1.563* 0.939 -0.355 
 2D:4D   (0.577)   (0.556)   (0.559)   (0.793)   (0.722)   (0.721) 
FED 0.136 0.190 0.209 0.280 0.127 0.069 
              (0.555) (0.555) (0.492) (0.497) (0.507) (0.509) 
Principal -1.751** -1.679** -1.465** -1.485** -1.286** -1.294** 
              (0.564) (0.549) (0.489) (0.484) (0.504) (0.499) 
Constant 6.293** 5.624** 6.564** 6.107** 6.709** 6.871** 8.623** 9.777** 8.127** 7.678** 8.224** 8.682** 
  (0.422) (0.534) (0.374) (0.492) (0.394) (0.498) (0.665) (0.780) (0.573) (0.718) (0.596) (0.736) 
N 95 95 108 108 124 124 95 95 108 108 123 123 
Adj. R-sq. 0.085 0.109 0.003 0.000 -0.024 -0.024 0.098 0.117 0.075 0.086 0.032 0.042 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 8. Estimates of risk and time preferences with gender dummy 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
CRRA-exponential 
discounting 
CRRA-hyperbolic 
discounting 
expo-
power/exponential 
discounting 
r Visual -0.022 (0.035) -0.023 (0.035) -0.116 (0.077) 
Task Order -0.080 (0.068) -0.084 (0.067) -0.063 (0.090) 
Male -0.120* (0.069) -0.121* (0.068) -0.051 (0.086) 
  Constant 0.647** (0.072) 0.636** (0.071) 0.294** (0.117) 
α Visual 0.435 (0.310) 
Task Order 0.363 (0.309) 
Male 0.262 (0.315) 
  Constant         1.654** (0.441) 
γ Visual -0.089 (0.062) 
Task Order -0.006 (0.070) 
Male 0.039 (0.064) 
  Constant         0.682** (0.090) 
δ FED -0.003 (0.021) -0.001 (0.021) -0.010 (0.022) 
Principal -0.089** (0.031) -0.090** (0.031) -0.157** (0.034) 
Task Order 0.133** (0.057) 0.132** (0.057) 0.063 (0.048) 
Male 0.104* (0.054) 0.102* (0.053) 0.016 (0.043) 
  Constant 0.209** (0.048) 0.211** (0.047) 0.256** (0.052) 
μ 0.130** (0.006) 0.130** (0.006) 0.091** (0.004) 
ν 0.039** (0.005) 0.039** (0.005) 0.005** (0.001) 
 N 8280   8280   8280   
 Log-pseudolikelihood -3807.934   -3783.290   -3739.584   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05  
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Table 9. Estimates of risk and time preferences with menstrual cycle variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Excluding pill takers Including pill takers 
With progesterone, 
estradiol dummies, 
including pill takers 
r Visual -0.053 (0.103) -0.036 (0.090) -0.058 (0.079) 
Task -0.049 (0.123) 0.009 (0.114) -0.004 (0.091) 
Menstrual -0.207 (0.197) -0.139 (0.150) 
Proliferative  0.118 (0.162) -0.086 (0.255) 
Ovulatory  0.035 (0.229) -0.020 (0.243) 
Luteal  0.185 (0.152) 0.252 (0.164) 
Pre-menstrual  -0.107 (0.147) -0.094 (0.169) 
Pill 0.132 (0.282) 0.117 (0.177) 
Estradiol -0.063 (0.199) 
Progesterone 0.329 (0.297) 
  Constant 0.183 (0.125) 0.132 (0.108) 0.150* (0.090) 
α Visual 0.323 (0.468) 0.269 (0.375) 0.383 (0.355) 
Task 0.218 (0.389) 0.208 (0.344) 0.314 (0.336) 
Menstrual 0.608 (0.591) 1.041* (0.564) 
Proliferative  -0.313 (0.491) -0.258 (0.412) 
Ovulatory  -0.118 (0.663) -0.114 (0.645) 
Luteal  -0.884* (0.485) -0.973** (0.469) 
Pre-menstrual  0.054 (0.595) -0.008 (0.562) 
Pill -0.100 (0.499) 0.093 (0.482) 
Estradiol -0.298 (0.392) 
Progesterone -0.763 (0.501) 
  Constant 2.505** (0.512) 2.546** (0.447) 2.398** (0.437) 
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γ Visual -0.054 (0.096) -0.027 (0.073) -0.041 (0.065) 
Task -0.007 (0.113) 0.040 (0.085) 0.030 (0.066) 
Menstrual -0.154 (0.100) -0.137 (0.100) 
Proliferative  -0.069 (0.095) -0.161 (0.123) 
Ovulatory  -0.007 (0.222) -0.054 (0.199) 
Luteal  0.033 (0.141) 0.074 (0.156) 
Pre-menstrual  -0.052 (0.103) -0.030 (0.127) 
Pill 0.113 (0.244) 0.128 (0.177) 
Estradiol -0.150 (0.097) 
Progesterone 0.234 (0.203) 
  Constant 0.696** (0.122) 0.650** (0.086) 0.657** (0.072) 
δ FED -0.004 (0.021) -0.008 (0.023) -0.007 (0.021) 
Principal -0.148** (0.029) -0.169** (0.033) -0.161** (0.027) 
Task 0.082 (0.055) 0.051 (0.052) 0.046 (0.045) 
Menstrual 0.029 (0.078) -0.026 (0.075) 
Proliferative  -0.014 (0.053) 0.058 (0.124) 
Ovulatory  -0.061 (0.062) -0.053 (0.075) 
Luteal  0.000 (0.070) -0.012 (0.070) 
Pre-menstrual  0.016 (0.066) 0.022 (0.083) 
Pill -0.045 (0.113) -0.060 (0.087) 
Estradiol 0.064 (0.099) 
Progesterone -0.053 (0.090) 
  Constant 0.227** (0.040) 0.254** (0.044) 0.247** (0.039) 
μ 0.087** (0.005) 0.088** (0.005) 0.090** (0.004) 
  ν 0.004** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001) 
N   7680   8280   8280   
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Log-pseudolikelihood -3384.015   -3688.220   -3710.481   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 10. Estimates of risk and time preferences with 2D:4D variables 
(1) (2) 
    With 2D:4D squared term With 2D:4D quartiles 
r Visual -0.120 (0.074) -0.126* (0.070) 
Task -0.078 (0.098) -0.042 (0.091) 
Male -0.065 (0.101) -0.114 (0.149) 
2D:4D -0.003 (0.041) 
(2D:4D)2 -0.008 (0.020) 
Medium 2D:4D 0.152 (0.158) 
High  2D:4D 0.108 (0.108) 
  Constant 0.325** (0.128) 0.226* (0.121) 
α Visual 0.407 (0.313) 0.447 (0.292) 
Task 0.327 (0.322) 0.308 (0.341) 
Male 0.341 (0.355) 0.169 (0.336) 
2D:4D 0.204 (0.132) 
(2D:4D)2 -0.077 (0.106) 
Medium 2D:4D 0.085 (0.370) 
High  2D:4D 0.319 (0.413) 
  Constant 1.815** (0.490) 1.536** (0.522) 
γ Visual -0.094 (0.061) -0.098* (0.056) 
Task -0.012 (0.082) 0.015 (0.068) 
Male 0.023 (0.077) -0.015 (0.116) 
2D:4D -0.020 (0.037) 
(2D:4D)2 -0.000 (0.020) 
Medium 2D:4D 0.084 (0.138) 
High  2D:4D -0.010 (0.076) 
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  Constant 0.704** (0.095) 0.672** (0.090) 
δ FED -0.013 (0.019) -0.017 (0.027) 
Principal -0.141** (0.036) -0.190** (0.045) 
Task 0.067 (0.049) 0.070 (0.057) 
Male 0.015 (0.042) 0.067 (0.087) 
2D:4D -0.021 (0.018) 
(2D:4D)2 0.014 (0.010) 
Medium 2D:4D -0.099* (0.056) 
High  2D:4D -0.087 (0.056) 
  Constant 0.228** (0.056) 0.315** (0.068) 
μ 0.092** (0.004) 0.092** (0.005) 
  ν 0.005** (0.001) 0.005** (0.001) 
N   8280   8280   
Log-pseudolikelihood -3722.974   -3717.063   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05  
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Figure 1. Hormone levels over the menstrual cycle (data obtained from Stricker et al., 2006) 
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Figure 2. Kernel density of 2D:4D by sex 
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Figure 3. RRA predictions and confidence intervals 
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Figure 4. RRA predictions and confidence intervals  
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